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I. INTRODUCTION
This essay examines the rationale for allocating the burden of per-
suasion in relation to the conformity of the tendered goods in sales
cases. In a recently published article which analyzes this problem from
an economic efficiency perspective, Professor Jody S. Kraus argues that
this burden should be shouldered by the party with the best access to
evidence.' By juxtaposing this argument with the principal writings on
the subject (inexplicably ignored and consequently not confronted by
Professor Kraus) I demonstrate that the argument and its supporting
ideas are severely flawed. Economic efficiency would place the persua-
sion burden upon plaintiffs, even when their access to evidence is infer-
ior relative to defendants'. As established long ago, access to evidence
may only be invoked as a controlling factor in allocating the burden of
production. Deviations from this conventional approach may be eco-
nomically justified in special cases, but sales cases are not special.
* Copyright © (November 1995) Alex Stein. Visiting Professor, University of Miami
School of Law (1994-95); Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
(1991-); LL.B. (1983); LL.M. (1987) (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Ph.D. (1990) (University
of London).
I am grateful to Ronald J. Allen, A. Michael Froomkin, and Eyal Zamir for their helpful
comments on an earlier draft.
1. Jody S. Kraus, Decoupling Sales Law from the Acceptance-Rejection Fulcrum, 104 YALE
L.J. 129, 135-52 (1994).
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II. 1890, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
James Bradley Thayer publishes a pioneering article that clarifies
the notion of "burden of proof" by distinguishing between the burden of
persuasion and that of producing evidence. 2 The persuasion burden allo-
cates risk of error in conditions of uncertainty, when the requisite stan-
dard of proof has not been satisfied by either side. This burden thus
functions to mark out the bearer of the risk of error. The production
burden is a duty to adduce evidence that needs to be brought before
judges or jurors. This burden thus functions to identify the party who
will be exposed to an adverse ruling when an issue pertaining to the case
is left evidentially unsubstantiated. Consequently, the reasons for allo-
cating each of these discrete burdens should also be different. For exam-
ple, the mere fact that one party to a proceeding holds relevant
information or has peculiarly good access to some important evidence
cannot be a valid reason for shifting the persuasion burden to him. Once
his evidence is produced for examination at the trial, his advantage evap-
orates. Bentham's idea of placing the burden of proof "on whom it will
sit lightest" 3 should accordingly only apply to the production burden.*
Allocation of the risk of non-persuasion should be grounded in other
reasons, such as substantive legal preferences.5
Although well-known, Thayer's approach has not been unequivo-
cally endorsed. This may partially explain, albeit not justify, Professor
Kraus's thesis.
III. 1994, NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT
Professor Kraus publishes an article examining, inter alia, the allo-
cation of the persuasion burden under the sales law provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), in relation to the issue of whether
tendered goods are "conforming."7 Under the UCC, this burden is
placed on the seller of rejected goods and the buyer of accepted goods.'
2. James B. Thayer, The Burdens of Proof 4 HARv. L. REV. 45 (1890). The same later
appeared in Thayer's book A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW ch.9
(Augustus M. Kelley 1969) (1898).
3. JEREMY BENTHAM, An Introductory View of Rationale of Evidence; For the Use of Non-
Lawyers as Well as Lawyers, in 6 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 139 (John Bowring ed.,
1962).
4. Thayer, supra note 2, at 59-70.
5. Id. at 64-65; see generally Charles V. Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of
Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REv. 195 (1953); James B. Thayer, Presumptions and the Law of
Evidence, 3 HARV. L. REv. 141 (1889).
6. See 2 CHARLES T. McCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337 (John W. Strong ed.,
4th ed. 1992); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 128-30 (1995).
7. Kraus, supra note 1.
8. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(8), 2-607(4) (1994). See Kraus, supra note 1, at 136-37.
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Confined to an economic analysis of the problem,9 Professor
Kraus's examination starts with the access to evidence, which he consid-
ers to be a plausible ground for allocating the persuasion burden.10 He
admits that "[t]he strength of this rationale ... has diminished since the
advent of modem discovery law,"'" arguing at the same time that it
"might still explain why the Code's burden-of-proof rule is efficient.112
Thoroughly discredited by Thayer (some decades before the advent
of modem discovery law), this rationale is manifestly weak. An attempt
at revitalizing it can therefore properly be made only by acknowledging
and confronting Thayer's argument. Unfortunately, Professor Kraus
ignores this argument altogether.
Another rationale examined by Professor Kraus is closely related to
the access to evidence. It places the persuasion burden upon the cheap-
est producer of cost-effective evidence.1 3 This rationale (to the best of
my knowledge) was pioneered by Bentham. 4 However, as explicated
by Thayer, Bentham used the term "burden of proof" generically, with-
out distinguishing between the two burdens. Thayer's argument makes
it clear that the cheapest producers of cost-effective evidence should
carry only the production burden. Regrettably, Professor Kraus fails to
explain why they should also absorb the risk of non-persuasion.
Professor Kraus's analysis of the problem focuses on incentives for
a self-interested litigant: one that would produce evidence favorable to
her case and try to suppress any unfavorable evidence.15 Would unfa-
vorable evidence be produced by a litigant if she carried the persuasion
burden? Certainly not. Production of unfavorable evidence would
entail a certain loss on the issue; to bear the risk of non-persuasion is to
be exposed only to a probable loss. 1 6 Truth lovers do not require the
incentives focused upon by Professor Kraus; as for Holmes's "Bad
Man," he will be left thoroughly unimpressed.1 7  The "access to evi-
9. Kraus, supra note 1, at 132-35, 138-41.
10. Id. at 142-46.
11. Id. at 142; see Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions in Civil Actions Reconsidered, 66 IOWA L.
REv. 843, 860 (1981) ("[lit is difficult to imagine a case today in which the sanction of possible
dismissal would generate more evidence than discovery schemes."); see also Laughlin, supra note
5, at 220.
12. Kraus, supra note 1, at 143.
13. Id. at 146-48.
14. BEmNHAM, supra note 3, at 136-39.
15. In some cases, evidence favorable to a litigant will not be produced because its benefits
are simply outweighed by the costs of production. From the utilitarian perspective, such outcomes
will be desirable.
16. Professor Kraus is apparently aware of this. See supra note 1, at 147 n.55.
17. As for ambiguous evidence, it will be produced only when it is expected to be more
beneficial than harmful. Allocation of the persuasion burden cannot affect such calculations. As
for hopelessly ambiguous evidence, I can see no economic justification for its extraction.
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dence" rationale would thus work against Bad Men and truth lovers
alike. Because the ratio of Bad Men and truth-lovers amongst buyers
and sellers of goods is unknown-and, indeed, unknowable-allocation
of the persuasion burden by this rationale would produce more disutility
than utility. It will not produce more correct verdicts than erroneous. At
the same time, it will exert a chilling effect on at least some truth lovers.
They will attempt to suppress evidence not unambiguously supportive of
their allegations, which they believe to be true. This chilling effect will
result from fear that every factual ambiguity will, justifiably or not, ben-
efit the opponent.' 8 As demonstrated below, efficiency concerns place
the persuasion burden upon plaintiffs, regardless of their position in liti-
gated sales transactions.' 9
IV. 1961, NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE
Professor Vaughn C. Ball publishes an influential article that will
become regarded as a precursor of the "New Evidence Scholarship."20
One of its insights was the following warning against double-counting:
The risk of non-persuasion is allocated (a great part of the time, at
least) upon the basis of the probability of the existence of the fact in
the run of cases of the particular kind, absent any specific evidence.
Since the evidence and the jury's consideration of it have come to
naught, we will make the fewest mistakes if we let the case fall back
into the general class, to be decided on those original probabilities.
But the jury, unless it lacks the common knowledge we ascribe to it
by definition, has begun its own deliberation with those probabilities
in mind, and it is the combination of both those and the probabilities
drawn from the specific evidence, that the jury says are at a balance.
If we then use the initial probabilities to remove the balance, we are
in some sense counting them twice.2'
V. 1994, NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT
The third rationale examined by Professor Kraus "seems to underlie
Inferential progress generated by such evidence would be minimal, while its examination at trial
would be costly. Cf. FED. R. EvID. 102 & 403.
18. See Steven Shavell, Optimal Sanctions and the Incentive to Provide Evidence to Legal
Tribunals, 9 Ir. REV. LAW & ECON. 3, 4 (1989).
19. But the UCC's allocation of the burden may still be justified on noneconomic grounds.
See discussion infra note 40.
20. Vaughn C. Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14
VAND. L. REv. 807 (1961). The "New Evidence Scholarship" is briefly described below. See
infra notes 32, 33 and accompanying text.
21. Ball, supra note 20, at 817-18 (footnote omitted). An example of this fallacy, referred to
by Professor Ball, can be found in Julius Stone, Burden of Proof and the Judicial Process, 60 L.
Q. REv. 262, 278-84 (1944); cf Laughlin, supra note 5, at 212.
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the practice of assigning the burden of proof to the party asserting con-
duct that is out of the ordinary. '22 The party most likely to be asserting
a false claim should thus carry the risk of non-persuasion:
Like the access-to-evidence and evidence-production rationales con-
sidered above, this rationale seeks cost-effectively to increase the
likelihood of accurate adjudication. If particular kinds of claims are
known to be probably false, then assigning the burden of proof to the
party asserting such claims might increase the accuracy of adjudica-
tion. Whatever reasons justify the ex ante belief that the sort of claim
being advanced is probably false would also justify a rebuttable legal
presumption that the claim is false. The allocation of the burden of
proof to the party asserting such a claim creates that presumption. As
a result, the party most likely to be correct will be more likely to
prevail. 23
Juxtaposition of this rationale with Professor Ball's argument can
be made without my assistance. Fortunately, Professor Kraus discards
this rationale in the context of his discussion. The prior probability of
finding liars amongst sellers of rejected goods is unknowable. This con-
clusion also holds true with regard to buyers of accepted goods.24 As for
the probability of conformity, it is similarly unknowable in relation to
both accepted and rejected goods.25
Professor Kraus thus concludes:
What is the best rule to substitute in place of the Code's burden-of-
proof rule? The rationale of assigning the burden to the party likely
to be asserting a false claim has no obvious application in sales cases,
and is misguided. Only the "access-to-evidence" rationale remains.
Therefore, the choice is between the two rules suggested by the two
different interpretations of the "access-to-evidence" rationale: the
"access-to-the goods" [sic] rule, which requires the party in posses-
sion to bear the burden, and the "access-to-inspection-evidence" rule,
which requires the buyer to bear the burden following tender. In the
absence of empirical data, it is difficult to choose between them; for-
tunately, they are likely to converge in most cases. Whenever the
buyer alleges nonconformity, the allegation is likely to be made after
tender and after the buyer has taken possession of the goods. I would
therefore support a rule allocating the burden of proof to the buyer
upon tender.26
Appropriate as it may be for allocating the production burden, this
rationale is thoroughly misguided when employed in placing the risk of
22. Kraus, supra note 1, at 148 n.56.
23. Id. at 148.
24. See id. at 149-50.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 151-52.
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non-persuasion. As stated above, this was demonstrated by Thayer in
1890.27
Despite this objection, Professor Kraus's conclusion could still sur-
vive, if the access-to-evidence rationale were the only rationale to sur-
vive scrutiny. This, however, is not the case. As Professor Kraus
himself acknowledges, other candidates include:
(1) allocation of the persuasion burden in accordance with the pleadings;
(2) allocation of the burden to a party asserting a disfavored claim or
defence;
(3) allocation of the burden to a party attributing wrongdoing to her
opponent;
(4) allocation of the burden to a party attempting to change the status
quo.28
The first two candidates can be dismissed as begging the ques-
tion.29 But what about the remaining two? Professor Kraus argues that
they can also be dismissed "because they offer no efficiency-based
rationale for allocating the burden of proof" and "because they are inap-
plicable to sales cases."30 As far as the economics of the wrongdoing
rationale are concerned, Professor Kraus is probably right.3 As for his
parenthetical remark about the status quo rationale, it surprised me even
more than his previous omissions.
VI. 1961 TO PRESENT, Too MANY PLACES To BE MENTIONED
The New Evidence Scholarship emerges and develops.3 2 It pro-
duces numerous interdisciplinary inquiries into various fact finding
27. Thayer, supra note 2, at 64-65.
28. Kraus, supra note 1, at 141 n.43.
29. See, e.g., Dale A. Nance, Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17 HRv. J. L. & PuB. PoL'Y
647, 663-69 (1994).
30. Kraus, supra note 1, at 141 n.43.
31. On this point, however, I fail to understand Professor Kraus's logic. According to his
own argument, a regularity-based allocation of the persuasion burden can, in principle, be justified
on efficiency grounds. Kraus, supra note 1, at 148-50. Most people assume, in proceeding in
daily affairs, that conformity with legal standards is far more common than wrongdoing. See
Nance, supra note 29, at 648-55. If so, the wrongdoing rationale can, perhaps, be justified on
efficiency *grounds as well.
Professor Nance supports this rationale from another angle. He argues that the existing
burden-allocating framework should be justified by the moral principle of civility. From this
principle he derives a rebuttable presumption in favor of compliance with the legally prescribed
standards. See id. at 655-72. Professor Nance's theory would allocate the persuasion burden to
the party alleging breach of contract by her opponent, and thus have an obvious impact in sales
cases.
32. The term was coined by Professor Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship:
Analyzing the Process of Proof 66 B.U. L. REv. 439 (1986).
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problems,3 incoming economic analyses of the persuasion burden as
applied in civil litigation. According to one of these analyses:
(1) Dd represents the disutility a plaintiff will sustain as a result of a
wrong decision for the defendant, and Dv represents the disutility a
defendant will sustain if the error favors the plaintiff.
(2) P represents the probability of the allegations brought by plaintiff.
(3) As the case is one of uncertainty, 0 < P < 1, where 1 represents
absolute certainty and 0 impossibility.
(4) Plaintiff should thus recover whenever:
P~d> (1-P) Dp.
(5) This can be reformulated as follows:
P> 1
1+Dd
(6) Subject to special cases, plaintiffs' and defendants' wrongful losses
are equally inefficient (and equally inequitable): DD = Dd.
(7) Hence, a plaintiff should recover whenever P>0.5, and a defendant
should win whenever P<0.5 (the "P>0.5 rule").34
The optimality of the P>0.5 rule has been demonstrated with an
even greater precision:
(1) D denotes the value of the litigated goods;
(2) p, and P2 denote, respectively, the probabilities of plaintiff's and
defendant's conflicting allegations. As is always the case: 0 < p, < 1
and 0 < P2 < 1, where 1 stands for certainty and 0 for impossibility.
(3) The following decisions thus become available:
dl= plaintiff loses (the risk of error is imposed on plaintiff);
d2 = defendant loses (the risk of error is imposed on defendant);
d3 = a compromise reflecting the expected value of each allegation:
plaintiff recovers from defendant p1D; p2D goes to defendant by not
allowing plaintiff to recover this amount.35
(4) S1 and S2 will now respectively denote the actual states of affairs,
favorable to either plaintiff or defendant.
(5) The average damage to be incurred by each of the available decisions
will be as follows:
33. For a brief survey see William L. Twining & Alex Stein, Introduction to EVIDENCE AND
PROOF at xxi-xxiv (William L. Twining*& Alex Stein eds., 1992).
34. John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Facfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1065,
1071-72 (1968); see also David Kaye, Naked Statistical Evidence, 89 YALE L.J. 601, 605 n.19
(1980) (book review).
35. The parties' trial expenses are ignored for the sake of simplicity.
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DECISION DAMAGE IF S DAM4GE IF S, TOTAL DAMAGE
d, p1D 0 pjD
d2  0 p2D p2D
d, Pp1p2D p2p1 D 2pIp 2D
(6) The long run probability-damage
sented and assessed as follows:
relationships can thus be repre-
0
Pi
f, = plaintiff absorbs the damage function corresponding to dj;
f2 = defendant absorbs the damage function corresponding to d2;
f3 = the expected value function corresponding to d3.36
In balanced cases, i.e., when PI=P2=0. 5 , each of the available deci-
sions will result in the same overall damage. From an economic view-
36. See David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably
Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 487, 493.
This theory has not gone unchallenged. It has been argued that under the diminishing utility
of wealth assumption--which would require the legal system to minimize large errors--d3 would
be the best decision. Indeed, by denoting the average large error as D2, we will arrive at the
following:
[Vol. 50:335
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point, however, defendant should prevail in such a case. This decision
rule would eliminate the enforcement costs that would be incurred if
plaintiff recovers. In addition, to allow plaintiff to recover when pl=0.5
would raise the number of unmeritorius claims, thus incurring greater
litigation costs.37 When PI=P2=0.5, decision d, would be optimal also
because taking is generally perceived as more harmful than not giving.
This perception can be justified by the diminishing utility of wealth.38
VII. 1996, CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA
My discussion has arrived at its concluding point. From an eco-
nomic efficiency perspective, a plaintiff should be denied recovery
whenever the probability of her allegations is below 0.5. This decision
rule should apply in all civil cases, including sales cases. In exceptional
circumstances, costs avoidable by this rule may be offset by other bene-
fits. If such circumstances are both recurrent and amenable to advance
doctrinal formalization, an appropriate replacement of the P>0.5 rule
would be in order.39
Typical sales cases do not involve such circumstances. The burden
DECISION DAMAGE IF S, DAMAGE IF S2 TOTAL DAMAGE
d, pID 2  0 pID 2
d2  0 p 2D
2  p2D
2
d3  p1(p2D)2  p2(p1D)2  PIP2D 2
See Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-
Evidence Standard, 131 U. PA. L. Rav. 1159, 1165-68 (1983).
37. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Jury and the Risk of Nonpersuasion, 5 LAW & Soc'Y RaV.
335, 337 (1971).
38. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 552 (4th ed. 1992). Incidentally,
this echoes the Jewish Law principle "f'Klfl imnr wxllati'r'lrf" ("one who purports to take
from his fellow man should bear the burden of proof."). See BABA KAMMA 6a, 46b (E.W. Kirzner
trans.) in I THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD: SEDER NEZIKIN (I. Epstein ed. & trans. 1952).
Empirical research has shown that giving away a psychologically "vested" right is perceived
as more painful than not seizing upon an identically valuable but psychologically "unvested"
right. See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENrr L. Rav. 23, 35-40 (1989); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251,
S260 (1986). This can also explain allowing plaintiff to recover from defendant only when P>0.5.
39. Leaving such decisions to judges would involve exorbitant enforcement costs.
Decomposition of the doctrine into a multitude of case-specific rules would involve unjustifiably
high promulgation costs. Determination of each individual rule would be undesirably costly,
while its enforcement benefits, attainable only in a few cases, would be very modest. The
proposed law-making strategy would therefore be optimal. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557 (1992). For a different proposal, not
motivated solely by efficiency concerns, see Ronald J. Allen & Robert A. Hillman, Evidentiary
Problems in-and Solutions for-the Uniform Commercial Code, 34 DuKE L.J. 92, 105-08
(1984) (proposing allowing judges to reallocate the persuasion burden in special circumstances).
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of proof rules should therefore be decoupled from the acceptance-rejec-
tion fulcrum, but not in a way suggested by Professor Kraus. The per-
suasion burden in sales litigation should always be placed upon the
plaintiff, irrespective of whether she is a buyer or a seller, and regardless
of whether the goods of disputed conformity were accepted or rejected.40
40. A rights-based, nonutilitarian approach would, however, lead to an entirely different
conclusion. Thus, under the equality principle, the persuasion burden should be distributed evenly
over issues rather than in a fashion that systematically favors defendant over plaintiff. This
principle may justify the UCC's allocation of the burden. See Alex Stein, The Refoundation of
Evidence Law, 9 CANADIAN J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE (forthcoming 1996). This justification should
be distinguished from the idea of equalizing the overall error rate between plaintiffs and
defendants as groups. See MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW 68 (1978).
Finkelstein's idea is untenable because members of his groups are not mutually associated and do
not share their gains and losses. See Kaye, supra note 34, at 607-08.
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